A mean-field game price model with noise by Gomes, Diogo et al.
A MEAN FIELD GAME PRICE MODEL WITH NOISE
DIOGO GOMES, JULIAN GUTIERREZ, AND RICARDO RIBEIRO
Abstract. In this paper, we propose a mean-field game model for the price forma-
tion of a commodity whose production is subjected to random fluctuations. The model
generalizes existing deterministic price formation models.
Agents seek to minimize their average cost by choosing their trading rates with a
price that is characterized by a balance between supply and demand. The supply and
the price processes are assumed to follow stochastic differential equations.
Here, we show that, for linear dynamics and quadratic costs, the optimal trading rates
are determined in feedback form. Hence, the price arises as the solution to a stochastic
differential equation, whose coefficients depend on the solution of a system of ordinary
differential equations.
1. Introduction
Mean-field games (MFG) is a tool to study the Nash equilibrium of infinite populations
of rational agents. These agents select their actions based on their state and the statistical
information about the population. Here, we study a price formation model for a commodity
traded in a market under uncertain supply, which is a common noise shared by the agents.
These agents are rational and aim to minimize the average trading cost by selecting their
trading rate. The distribution of the agents solves a stochastic partial differential equation.
Finally, a market-clearing condition characterizes the price.
We consider a commodity whose supply process is described by a stochastic differential
equation; that is, we are given a drift bS : [0, T ]×R2 → R and volatility σS : [0, T ]×R2 → R+0 ,
which are smooth functions, and the supply Qs is determined by the stochastic differential
equation
dQs = b
S(Qs, $s, s)ds+ σ
S(Qs, $s, s)dWs in [0, T ] (1.1)
with the initial condition q¯. We would like to determine the drift bP : [0, T ]× R2 → R, the
volatility σP : [0, T ]× R2 → R+0 , and w¯ such that the price $s solves
d$s = b
P (Qs, $s, s)ds+ σ
P (Qs, $s, s)dWs in [0, T ] (1.2)
with initial condition w¯ and such that it ensures a market clearing condition. It may not be
possible to find bP and σP in a feedback form. However, for linear dynamics, as we show
here, we can solve quadratic models, which are of great interest in applications.
Let Xs be the quantity of the commodity held by an agent at time s for t 6 s 6 T . This
agent trades this commodity, controlling its rate of change, v, thus
dXs = v(s)ds in [t, T ]. (1.3)
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At time t, an agent who holds x and observes q and w chooses a progressively measurable
control process v to minimize the expected cost functional
J(x, q, w, t; v) = E
[∫ T
t
L(Xs,v(s)) +$sv(s)ds+ Ψ (XT , QT , $T )
]
, (1.4)
subject to the dynamics (1.1), (1.2), and (1.3) with initial condition Xt = x, and the
expectation is taken w.r.t. the standard filtration generated by the Brownian motion. The
Lagrangian, L, takes into account costs such as market impact or storage, and the terminal
cost Ψ stands for the terminal preferences of the agent.
This control problem determines a Hamilton-Jacobi equation addressed in Section 2.1. In
turn, each agent selects an optimal control and uses it to adjust its holdings. Because the
source of noise in Qt is common to all agents, the evolution of the probability distribution
of agents is not deterministic. Instead, it is given by a stochastic transport equation derived
in Section 2.2. Finally, the price is determined by a market-clearing condition that ensures
that supply meets demand. We study this condition in Section 2.3.
Mathematically, the price model corresponds to the following problem.
Problem 1. Given a Hamiltonian, H : R2 → R, H ∈ C∞, a commotity’s supply initial
value, q¯ ∈ R, supply drift, bS : R2 × [0, T ]→ R, and supply volatility, σS : R2 × [0, T ]→ R,
a terminal cost, Ψ : R3 → R, Ψ ∈ C∞(R3), and an initial distribution of agents, m¯ ∈
C∞c (R) ∩ P(R), find u : R3 × [0, T ] → R, µ ∈ C([0, T ],P(R3)), w¯ ∈ R, the price at t = 0,
the price drift bP : R2 × [0, T ]→ R, and the price volatility σP : R2 × [0, T ]→ R solving
−ut +H(x,w + ux) = bSuq + bPuw + 12 (σS)2uqq + σSσPuqw + 12 (σP )2uww
dµt =
((
µ (σ
S)2
2
)
qq
+ (µσSσP )qw +
(
µ (σ
P )2
2
)
ww
− div(µb)
)
dt− div(µσ)dWt∫
R3 q +DpH(x,w + ux(x, q, w, t))µt(dx× dq × dw) = 0,
(1.5)
and the terminal-initial conditions{
u(x, q, w, T ) = Ψ(x, q, w)
µ0 = m¯× δq¯ × δw¯,
(1.6)
where b = (−DpH(x,w + ux), bS , bP ), σ = (0, σS , σP ), and the divergence is taken w.r.t.
(x, q, w).
Given a solution to the preceding problem, we construct the supply and price processes
Qt =
∫
R3
q µt(dx× dq × dw)
and
$t =
∫
R3
w µt(dx× dq × dw),
which also solve {
dQt = b
S(Qt, $t, t)dt+ σ
S(Qt, $t, t)dWt in [0, T ]
d$t = b
P (Qt, $t, t)dt+ σ
P (Qt, $t, t)dWt in [0, T ]
with initial conditions {
Q0 = q¯
$0 = w¯
(1.7)
and satisfy the market-clearing condition
Qt =
∫
R
−DpH(x,$t + ux(x,Qt, $t, t))µt(dx).
In [10], the authors presented a model where the supply for the commodity was a given
deterministic function, and the balance condition between supply and demand gave rise to
the price as a Lagrange multiplier. Price formation models were also studied by Markowich
et al. [18], Caffarelli et al. [2], and Burger et al. [1]. The behavior of rational agents
that control an electric load was considered in [17, 16]. For example, turning on or off space
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heaters controls the electric load as was discussed in [14, 15, 13]. Previous authors addressed
price formation when the demand is a given function of the price [12] or that the price is a
function of the demand, see, for example [6], [5], [7], [8], and [11]. An N -player version of
an economic growth model was presented in [9].
Noise in the supply together with a balance condition is a central issue in price formation
that could not be handled directly with the techniques in previous papers. A probabilistic
approach of the common noise is discussed in Carmona et al. in [4]. Another approach is
through the master equation, involving derivatives with respect to measures, which can be
found in [3]. None of these references, however, addresses problems with integral constraints
such as (1.7).
Our model corresponds to the one in [10] for the deterministic setting when we take the
volatility for the supply to be 0. Here, we study the linear-quadratic case, that is, when
the cost functional is quadratic, and the dynamics (1.1) and (1.2) are linear. In Section 3.2,
we provide a constructive approach to get semi-explicit solutions of price models for linear
dynamics and quadratic cost. This approach avoids the use of the master equation. The
paper ends with a brief presentation of simulation results in Section 4.
2. The Model
In this section, we derive Problem 1 from the price model. We begin with standard tools
of optimal control theory. Then, we derive the stochastic transport equation, and we end
by introducing the market-clearing (balance) condition.
2.1. Hamilton-Jacobi equation and verification theorem. The value function for an
agent who at time t holds an amount x of the commodity, whose instantaneous supply and
price are q and w, is
u(x, q, w, t) = inf
v
J(x, q, w, t; v) (2.1)
where J is given by (1.4) and the infimum is taken over the set A ((t, T ]) of all progressively
measurable functions v : [t, T ] → R. Consider the Hamiltonian, H, which is the Legendre
transform of L; that is, for p ∈ R,
H(x, p) = sup
v∈R
[−pv − L(x, v)]. (2.2)
Then, from standard stochastic optimal control theory, whenever L is strictly convex, if
u is C2, it solves the Hamilton-Jacobi equation in R3 × [0, T )
− ut +H(x,w + ux)− bPuw − bSuq − (σ
P )2
2 uww − (σ
S)2
2 uqq − σPσSuwq = 0 (2.3)
with the terminal condition
u(x, q, w, T ) = Ψ (x, q, w) . (2.4)
Moreover, as the next verification theorem establishes, any C2 solution of (2.3) is the value
function.
Theorem 2.1 (Verification). Let u˜ : [0, T ]×R3 → R be a smooth solution of (2.3) with
terminal condition (2.4). Let (X∗, Q,$) solve (1.3), (1.1) and (1.2), where X∗ is driven by
the progressively measurable control
v∗(s) := −DpH(X∗s, $s + u˜x(X∗s, Qs, $s, s)).
Then
1. v∗ is an optimal control for (2.1)
2. u˜ = u, the value function.
2.2. Stochastic transport equation. Theorem 2.1 provides an optimal feedback strategy.
As usual in MFG, we assume that the agents are rational and, hence, choose to follow this
optimal strategy. This behavior gives rise to a flow that transports the agents and induces a
random measure that encodes their distribution. Here, we derive a stochastic PDE solved by
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this random measure. To this end, let u solve (2.3) and consider the random flow associated
with the diffusion 
dXs = −DpH(Xs, $s + ux(Xs, Qs, $s, s))ds
dQs = b
S(Qs, $s, s)ds+ σ
S(Qs, $s, s)dWs
d$s = b
P (Qs, $s, s)ds+ σ
P (Qs, $s, s)dWs
(2.5)
with initial conditions 
X0 = x
Q0 = q¯
$0 = w¯.
That is, for a given realization ω of the common noise, the flow maps the initial conditions
(x, q¯, w¯) to the solution of (2.5) at time t, which we denote by (Xωt (x, q¯, w¯), Q
ω
t (q¯, w¯), $
ω
t (q¯, w¯)).
Using this map, we define a measure-valued stochastic process µt as follows:
Definition 2.2. Let ω denote a realization of the common noise W on 0 6 s 6 T . Given
a measure m¯ ∈ P(R) and initial conditions q¯, w¯ ∈ R take µ¯ ∈ P(R3) by µ¯ = m¯× δq¯× δw¯ and
define a random measure µt by the mapping ω 7→ µωt ∈ P(R3), where µωt is characterized as
follows: for any bounded and continuous function ψ : R3 → R∫
R3
ψ(x, q, w)µωt (dx× dq × dw)
=
∫
R3
ψ (Xωt (x, q, w), Q
ω
t (q, w), $
ω
t (q, w)) µ¯(dx× dq × dw).
Remark 2.3. Because µ¯ = m¯× δq¯ × δw¯, we have∫
R3
ψ (Xωt (x, q, w), Q
ω
t (q, w), $
ω
t (q, w)) µ¯(dx× dq × dw)
=
∫
R
ψ (Xωt (x, q¯, w¯), Q
ω
t (q¯, w¯), $
ω
t (q¯, w¯)) m¯(dx).
Moreover, due to the structure of (2.5),
µωt = (X
ω
t (x, q¯, w¯)#m¯)× δQωt (q¯,w¯) × δ$ωt (q¯,w¯).
Definition 2.4. Let µ¯ ∈ P(R3) and write
b(x, q, w, s) = (−DpH(x,w + ux(x, q, w, s)), bS(q, w, s), bP (q, w, s)),
σ(q, w, s) = (0, σS(q, w, s), σP (q, w, s)).
A measure-valued stochastic process µ = µ(·, t) = µt(·) is a weak solution of the stochastic
PDE
dµt =
(
−div(µb) +
(
µ (σ
S)2
2
)
qq
+ (µσSσP )qw +
(
µ (σ
P )2
2
)
ww
)
dt− div(µσ)dWt, (2.6)
with initial condition µ¯ if for any bounded smooth test function ψ : R3 × [0, T ]→ R∫
R3
ψ(x, q, w, t)µt(dx× dq × dw) =
∫
R3
ψ(x, q, w, 0)µ¯(dx× dq × dw) (2.7)
+
∫ t
0
∫
R3
∂tψ +Dψ · b + 12 tr
(
σTσD2ψ
)
µs(dx× dq × dw)ds (2.8)
+
∫ t
0
∫
R3
Dψ · σµs(dx× dq × dw)dWs, (2.9)
where the arguments for b, σ and ψ are (x, q, w, s) and the differential operators D and D2
are taken w.r.t. the spatial variables x, q, w.
Theorem 2.5. Let m¯ ∈ P(R) and q¯, w¯ ∈ R. The random measure from Definition 2.2
is a weak solution of the stochastic partial differential equation (2.6) with initial condition
µ¯ = m¯× δq¯ × δw¯.
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Proof. Let ψ : R3 × [0, T ]→ R be a bounded smooth test function. Consider the stochastic
process s 7→ ∫R3 ψ(x, q, w, s)µωs (dx× dq × dw). Let
(Xt(x, q¯, w¯), Qt(q¯, w¯), $t(q¯, w¯))
be the flow induced by (2.5). By the definition of µωt ,∫
R3
ψ(x, q, w, t)µωt (dx× dq × dw)−
∫
R3
ψ(x, q, w, 0)µ¯(dx× dq × dw)
=
∫
R
[ψ(Xωt (x, q¯, w¯), Q
ω
t (q¯, w¯), $
ω
t (q¯, w¯), t)− ψ(x, q¯, w¯, 0)] m¯(dx).
Then, applying Ito’s formula to the stochastic process
s 7→
∫
R
ψ(Xs(x, q¯, w¯), Qs(q¯, w¯), $s(q¯, w¯), s)m¯(dx),
the preceding expression becomes∫ t
0
d
(∫
R
ψ(Xs(x, q¯, w¯), Qs(q¯, w¯), $s(q¯, w¯), s)m¯(dx)
)
ds
=
∫ t
0
∫
R
[
Dtψ +Dψ · b + 12 tr(σTσD2ψ)
]
m¯(dx)ds
+
∫ t
0
∫
R
Dψ · σm¯(dx)dWs
=
∫ t
0
∫
R3
[
Dtψ +Dψ · b + 12 tr(σTσD2ψ)
]
µs(dx× dq × dw)ds
+
∫ t
0
∫
R3
Dψ · σµs(dx× dq × dw)dWs,
where arguments of b, σ and the partial derivatives of ψ in the integral with respect to m¯(dx)
are (Xs(x, q¯, w¯), Qs(q¯, w¯), $s(q¯, w¯), s), and in the integral with respect to µt(dx× dq × dw)
are (x, q, w, t). Therefore,∫
R3
ψ(x, q, w, t)µωt (dx× dq × dw)−
∫
R3
ψ(x, q, w, 0)µ¯(dx× dq × dw)
=
∫ t
0
∫
R3
[
Dtψ +Dψ · b + 12 tr(D2ψ : (σ,σ))
]
µωs (dx× dq × dw)ds
+
∫ t
0
∫
R3
Dψ · σµωs (dx× dq × dw)dWs.
Hence, (2.7) holds. 
2.3. Balance condition. The balance condition requires the average trading rate to be
equal to the supply. Because agents are rational and, thus, use their optimal strategy, this
condition takes the form
Qt =
∫
R3
−DpH(x,w + ux(x, q, w, t))µωt (dx× dq × dw), (2.10)
where µωt is given by Definition 2.2. Because Qt satisfies a stochastic differential equation,
the previous can also be read in differential form as
bS(Qt, $t, t)dt+ σ
S(Qt, $t, t)dWt = d
∫
R3
−DpH(x,w + ux(x, q, w, t))µωt (dx× dq × dw).
(2.11)
The former condition determines bP and σP . In general, bP and σP are only progressively
measurable and not in feedback form. In this case, the Hamilton–Jacobi (2.3) must be
replaced by either a stochastic partial differential equation or the problem must be modeled
by the master equation. However, as we discuss next, in the linear-quadratic case, we can
find bP and σP in feedback form.
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3. Potential-free Linear-quadratic price model
Here, we consider a price model for linear dynamics and quadratic cost. The Hamilton-
Jacobi equation admits quadratic solutions. Then, the balance equation determines the
dynamics of the price, and the model is reduced to a first-order system of ODE.
Suppose that L(x, v) = c2v
2 and, thus, H(x, p) = 12cp
2. Accordingly, the corresponding
MFG model is
−ut + 12c (w + ux)2 − bPuw − bSuq − 12 (σP )2uww − 12 (σS)2uqq − σPσSuwq = 0
dµt =
((
µ (σ
S)2
2
)
qq
+ (µσSσP )qw +
(
µ (σ
P )2
2
)
ww
− div(µb)
)
dt− div(µσ)dWt
Qt = − 1c$t +
∫
R− 1cux(x, q, w, t)µωt (dx× dq × dw).
(3.1)
Assume further that Ψ is quadratic; that is,
Ψ(x, q, w) = c0 + c
1
1x+ c
2
1q + c
3
1w + c
1
2x
2 + c22xq + c
3
2xw + c
4
2q
2 + c52qw + c
6
2w
2.
3.1. Balance condition. Let
Πt =
∫
R3
ux(x, q, w, t)µt(dx× dq × dw).
The balance condition is Qt = − 1c ($t + Πt). Furthermore, Definition 2.2 provides the
identity
Πt =
∫
R
ux(X
∗
t (x, q¯, w¯), Qt(q¯, w¯), $t(q¯, w¯), t)m¯(dx).
Lemma 3.1. Let (X∗, Q,$) solve (1.3), (1.1) and (1.2) with v = v∗, the optimal control,
and initial conditions q¯, w¯ ∈ R. Let u ∈ C3(R3 × [0, T ]) solve the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
(2.3). Then
dΠt =
∫
R
(
uxqσ
S + uxwσ
P
)
m¯(dx)dWt, (3.2)
where the arguments for the partial derivatives of u are (X∗t (x, q¯, w¯), Qt(q¯, w¯), $t(q¯, w¯), t).
Proof. By Itoˆ’s formula, the process t 7→ ux(X∗t , Qt, $t, t) solves
d
(
ux(X
∗
t , Qt, $t, t)
)
=
(
uxt + uxxv
∗ + uxqbS + uxwbP + uxqq 12 (σ
S)2 + uxqwσ
SσP + uxww
1
2 (σ
P )2
)
dt+
+
(
uxqσ
S + uxwσ
P
)
dWt, (3.3)
with v∗(t) = − 1c ($t + ux(X∗t , Qt, $t, t)). By differentiating the Hamilton-Jacobi equation,
we get
−utx + 1c ($t + ux)uxx − bPuwx − bSuqx − (σ
P )2
2 uwwx − (σ
S)2
2 uqqx − σPσSuwqx = 0.
Substituting the previous expression in (3.3), we have
d
(∫
R
ux(X
∗
t (x, q¯, w¯), Qt(q¯, w¯), $t(q¯, w¯), t)m¯(dx)
)
=
∫
R
(
1
c ($t + ux)uxx + uxxv
∗) m¯(dx)dt+ ∫
R
(
uxqσ
S + uxwσ
P
)
m¯(dx)dWt.
The preceding identity simplifies to∫
R
(
uxqσ
S + uxwσ
P
)
m¯(dx)dWt. 
Using Lemma 3.1, we have
−cdQt =
∫
R
(
uxqσ
S + uxwσ
P
)
m¯(dx)dWt + d$t;
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that is,
−cbSdt− cσSdWt =
(
σS
∫
R
uxqm¯(dx) + σ
P
∫
R
uxwm¯(dx)
)
dWt + d$t
= bP dt+
(
σS
∫
R
uxqm¯(dx) + σ
P
∫
R
uxwm¯(dx) + σ
P
)
dWt.
Thus,
bP = −cbS , (3.4)
σP = −σS c+
∫
R uxqm¯(dx)
1 +
∫
R uxwm¯(dx)
.
3.2. Quadratic solutions to the Hamilton Jacobi equation. If u is a second-degree
polynomial with time-dependent coefficients, then∫
R
uxq(X
∗
t (x, q¯, w¯), Qt(q¯, w¯), $t(q¯, w¯), t)m¯(dx)
and ∫
R
uxw(X
∗
t (x, q¯, w¯), Qt(q¯, w¯), $t(q¯, w¯), t)m¯(dx)
are deterministic functions of time. Accordingly, bP and σP are given in feedback form
by (3.4), thus, consistent with the original assumption. Here, we investigate the linear-
quadratic case that admits solutions of this form.
Now, we assume that the dynamics are affine; that is,
bP (t, q, w) = bP0 (t) + qb
P
1 (t) + wb
P
2 (t)
bS(t, q, w) = bS0 (t) + qb
S
1 (t) + wb
S
2 (t)
σP (t, q, w) = σP0 (t) + qσ
P
1 (t) + wσ
P
2 (t)
σS(t, q, w) = σS0 (t) + qσ
S
1 (t) + wσ
S
2 (t).
(3.5)
Then, (3.4) gives
bP0 = −cbS0 , σP0 = −σS0
c+
∫
R uxqm¯(dx)
1 +
∫
R uxwm¯(dx)
bP1 = −cbS1 , σP1 = −σS1
c+
∫
R uxqm¯(dx)
1 +
∫
R uxwm¯(dx)
bP2 = −cbS2 , σP2 = −σS2
c+
∫
R uxqm¯(dx)
1 +
∫
R uxwm¯(dx)
.
Because all the terms in the Hamilton Jacobi equation are at most quadratic, we seek for
solutions of the form
u(t, x, q, w) =a0(t) + a
1
1(t)x+ a
2
1(t)q + a
3
1(t)w
+ a12(t)x
2 + a22(t)xq + a
3
2(t)xw + a
4
2(t)q
2 + a52(t)qw + a
6
2(t)w
2,
where aji : [0, T ]→ R. Therefore, the previous identities reduce to
bP0 = −cbS0 , σP0 = −σS0
c+ a22
1 + a32
bP1 = −cbS1 , σP1 = −σS1
c+ a22
1 + a32
bP2 = −cbS2 , σP2 = −σS2
c+ a22
1 + a32
. (3.6)
Using (3.6) and grouping coefficients in the Hamilton Jacobi PDE, we obtain the following
ODE system
a˙12 =
2(a12)
2
c
a˙22 =
c2a32b
S
1−ca22bS1 +2a12a22
c
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a˙32 =
c2a32b
S
2−ca22bS2 +2a12+2a12a32
c
a˙11 =
c2a32b
S
0−ca22bS0 +2a11a12
c
a˙42 =ca
5
2b
S
1 − 2a42bS1 +
a52(a
2
2+c)(σ
S
1 )
2
a32+1
+ 14
(
− 4a
6
2(a
2
2+c)
2
(σS1 )
2
(a32+1)
2 − 4a42
(
σS1
)2)
+
(a22)
2
2c
a˙52 =2ca
6
2b
S
1 + ca
5
2b
S
2 − a52bS1 − 2a42bS2 + 12
(
− 4a
6
2(a
2
2+c)
2
σS1 σ
S
2
(a32+1)
2 − 4a42σS1 σS2
)
+
2a52(a
2
2+c)σ
S
1 σ
S
2
a32+1
+
a22(a
3
2+1)
c
a˙62 =2ca
6
2b
S
2 − a52bS2 + 14
(
− 4a
6
2(a
2
2+c)
2
(σS2 )
2
(a32+1)
2 − 4a42
(
σS2
)2)
+
a52(a
2
2+c)(σ
S
2 )
2
a32+1
+
(a32+1)
2
2c
a˙0 =ca
3
1b
S
0 − a21bS0 +
a52(a
2
2+c)(σ
S
0 )
2
a32+1
+ 12
(
− 2a
6
2(a
2
2+c)
2
(σS0 )
2
(a32+1)
2 − 2a42
(
σS0
)2)
+
(a11)
2
2c
a˙21 =ca
5
2b
S
0 + ca
3
1b
S
1 − 2a42bS0 − a21bS1 +
2a52(a
2
2+c)σ
S
0 σ
S
1
a32+1
+ 12
(
− 4a
6
2(a
2
2+c)
2
σS0 σ
S
1
(a32+1)
2 − 4a42σS0 σS1
)
+
a11a
2
2
c
a˙31 =2ca
6
2b
S
0 + ca
3
1b
S
2 − a52bS0 − a21bS2 + 12
(
− 4a
6
2(a
2
2+c)
2
σS0 σ
S
2
(a32+1)
2 − 4a42σS0 σS2
)
+
2a52(a
2
2+c)σ
S
0 σ
S
2
a32+1
+
a11(a
3
2+1)
c ,
with terminal conditions
a0(T ) = Ψ(0, 0, 0) = c0 a
1
1(T ) = DxΨ(0, 0, 0) = c
1
1
a21(T ) = DqΨ(0, 0, 0) = c
2
1 a
3
1(T ) = DwΨ(0, 0, 0) = c
3
1
a12(T ) =
1
2DxxΨ(0, 0, 0) = c
1
2 a
2
2(T ) = DxqΨ(0, 0, 0) = c
2
2
a32(T ) = DxwΨ(0, 0, 0) = c
3
2 a
4
2(T ) =
1
2DqqΨ(0, 0, 0) = c
4
2
a52(T ) = DqwΨ(0, 0, 0) = c
5
2 a
6
2(T ) =
1
2DwwΨ(0, 0, 0) = c
6
2.
While this system has a complex structure, it admits some simplifications. For example, the
equation for a12 is independent of other terms and has the solution
a12(t) =
cc12
c+2c12(T−t) .
Moreover, we can determine a22 and a
3
2 from the linear system
d
dt
[
a22
a32
]
=
[−bS1 + 2ca12 cbS1−bS2 cbS2 + 2ca12
] [
a22
a32
]
+
[
0
2
ca
1
2
]
.
Lemma 3.1 takes the form
dΠt =
(
a22(t)σ
S(Qt, $t, t) + a
3
2(t)σ
P (Qt, $t, t)
)
dWt.
Therefore,
Πt = Π0 +
∫ t
0
(
a22(r)σ
S(Qr, $r, r) + a
3
2(r)σ
P (Qr, $r, r)
)
dWr
where
Π0 = a
1
1(0) + 2a
1
2(0)
∫
R
xm¯(dx) + a22(0)q¯ + a
3
2(0)w¯.
Replacing the above in the balance condition at the initial time, that is w¯ = −cq¯ − Π0, we
obtain the initial condition for the price
w¯ = −1
1+a32(0)
(
a11(0) + 2a
1
2(0)
∫
R
xm¯(dx) + (a22(0) + c)q¯
)
. (3.7)
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where a11 can be obtained after solving for a
1
2, a
2
2 and a
3
2.
Now, we proceed with the price dynamics using the balance condition. Under linear dynam-
ics, we have
Qt = − 1c ($t + Π0)
− 1c
∫ t
0
a22(r)
(
σS0 (r) +Qrσ
S
1 (r) +$rσ
S
2 (r)
)
+ a32(r)
(
σP0 (r) +Qrσ
P
1 (r) +$rσ
P
2 (r)
)
dWr.
Thus, replacing the price coefficients for (3.6), we obtain
d$t =− c
(
bS0 (t) + b
S
1 (t)Qt + b
S
2 (t)$t
)
dt
− c+a22(t)
1+a32(t)
(
σS0 (t) + σ
S
1 (t)Qt + σ
S
2 (t)$t
)
dWt,
dQt =b
Sdt+ σSdWt,
which determines the dynamics for the price.
4. Simulation results
In this section, we consider the running cost corresponding to c = 1; that is,
L(v) = 12v
2
and terminal cost at time T = 1
Ψ(x) = (x− α)2.
We take m¯ to be a normal standard distribution; that is, with zero-mean and unit variance.
We assume the dynamics for the normalized supply is mean-reverting
dQt = (1−Qt)dt+QtdWt,
with initial condition q¯ = 1. Therefore, the dynamics for the price becomes
d$t = −(1−Qt)dt− 1+a
2
2
1+a32
QtdWt,
with initial condition w¯ given by (3.7), and a22 and a
3
2 solve
a˙22 =− a32 + a22(1 + 2a12)
a˙32 =2a
1
2(1 + a
3
2),
with terminal conditions a22(1) = 0 and a
3
2(1) = 0. We observe that the coefficient multi-
plying Qt in the volatility of the price is now time-dependent. For a fixed simulation of the
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
t
-2
2
4
Qtωt (α=0)ωt (α=0.25)ωt (α=0.5)ωt (α=0.75)
Fig. 1. Supply vs. Price for the values α = 0, α = 0.1, α = 0.25, α = 0.5
supply, we compute the price for different values of α. Agents begin with zero energy aver-
age. The results are displayed in Figure 1. As expected, the price is negatively correlated
with the supply. Moreover, as the storage target increases, prices increase, which reflects
the competition between agents who, on average, want to increase their storage.
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